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Obesity Liability: A Super-Sized Problem or a 
Small Fry in the Inevitable Development of 
Product Liability? 
Samuel J. Romero∗ 
ìIt would be safer if they told their children, ëGo out and play in 
traffic.íî1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For most of us, food is the ultimate temptation.  It has been 
since Biblical times, when Adam and Eve succumbed to the 
temptation of a forbidden fruit.  According to Christian tradition, 
man remains personally responsible for Adamís act of eating 
forbidden fruit with the knowledge that it was forbidden.2  In the 
past few years, several federal and state courts have been asked 
to adjudicate who should be held responsibleófast-food 
restaurants or their consumersófor the health problems that 
result from restaurantsí success in tempting consumers to eat 
their products.3  The fast-food restaurants insist they should not 
be held responsible when their customers choose to consume 
these food products knowing the products could contribute to 
obesity.4  Nevertheless, some consumer advocates believe that 
 
∗ Juris Doctorate Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, May 2004.  This article 
was made possible by the patient and insightful critique of Professor Melissa Berry.  I 
also want to thank Amy Duncan, Brock Zimmon, Christian Spaulding, Rick Faulkner, 
and the Chapman Law Review members and staff for their insightful editing and 
assistance.  Finally, I would like to thank my parents Joel and Sarah Romero for their 
many prayers, immeasurable support, and Christian guidance. 
 1 Irvin Molotsky, Risk Seen in Saturated Fats Used in Fast Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
15, 1985, at A20 (quoting Dr. Tazewell Banks, director of a heart program at D.C. General 
Hospital, on the subject of parents who allow their children to eat foods rich in 
unsaturated fats at fast-food restaurants). 
 2 Romans 5:12-21. 
 3 See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Nathan K. Bierma, Food Industry Cooks up Ways to Stymie Suits, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 
2003, ß 5, at 1 (discussing the food industryís response to seven obesity suits); Geraldine 
Sealey, Whopper of a Lawsuit: Fast-Food Chains Blamed for Obesity, Illnesses (describing 
a lawsuit brought by a 270-pound man against McDonaldís and three other fast-food 
restaurant chains), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/fatsuit020725.html (July 
26, 2002). 
 4 Press Release, National Restaurant Association, National Restaurant Association 
Supports Prevention of Abusive Lawsuits Against Food Industry (Jan. 28, 2003) (ìExperts 
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these restaurants should be held responsible for the negative 
health effects these products create, especially when the negative 
effects impact children.5 
Plaintiffs suing the fast-food industry for causing consumer 
obesity have been unsuccessful in the courts.6  For example, on 
January 22, 2003, a New York federal district court dismissed 
ìobesityî claims against McDonaldís by the guardians of two 
obese children, stating: 
[L]egal consequences should not attach to the consumption of 
hamburgers and other fast-food fare unless consumers are 
unaware of the dangers of eating such food . . . . If consumers 
know (or reasonably should know) the potential ill health 
effects of eating at McDonalds, they cannot blame McDonalds 
if they, nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite with a 
surfeit of supersized McDonalds products.7 
The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.8  Nine 
months later, after the plaintiffs had amended their complaint, 
the court determined that there was again insufficient evidence 
to resist McDonaldís motion to dismiss.9  The district courtís final 
dismissal without leave to amend constituted the first 
substantive defeat of the nascent campaign against the fast-food 
industryís promotion of obesity. 
Obesity is a costly reality of American life.10  In 2001, the 
Surgeon General described obesity as having ìreached epidemic 
 
agree that all food can be part of a healthy diet and maintaining a healthy lifestyle is 
more about balancing energy in and energy out, not chastising some of Americaís favorite 
foods.  Restaurants should not and will not be blamed for issues of personal responsibility 
and freedom of choice.î), http://www.restaurant.org/pressroom/print/index.cfm?ID=549. 
 5 Bierma, supra note 3.  San Francisco attorney Stephen Joseph, who sued Kraft 
successfully for failing to disclose the danger of trans fats in Oreos, discussed the 
potential for litigation involving child plaintiffs.  Mr. Joseph stated, ìëShould adults be 
suing because of obesity?  No.  In cases regarding children?  There are certainly good 
arguments of liability in some situations.íî  Id.  Even 2004 Democratic Presidential 
candidate Senator Joe Lieberman has supported the idea that children should be 
protected from the marketing practices of the fast-food companies.  Ira Teinowitz, 
Lieberman on Attack Against Fast-Food Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 8, 2003, at 4. 
 6 Bierma, supra note 3.  ì[N]one of the estimated seven obesity lawsuits nationwide 
has gained a major victory for plaintiffs . . . .î  Id.  On the other hand, success is not 
always measured by wins and losses in the court.  Consumer advocates also claim success 
if they can point to changed behavior in the food industry.  See id. (positing that the 
threat of litigation may change behavior). 
 7 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 517-18, 543. 
 8 Id. at 543. 
 9 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14-15 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003). 
 10 See Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic: A Public 
Health Policy Approach, 115 PUB. HEALTH REP. 12 (2000) (discussing the effects of obesity 
and arguing for increased attention to preventative measures); Anne M. Wolf, The Health 
Economics of Obesity and Weight Loss, in EATING DISORDERS AND OBESITY: A 
COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 453 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Kelly D. Brownell eds., 2d 
ed. 2002) (comparing the economic impact of obesity to that of smoking). 
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proportions in the United States.î11  He associated 300,000 
deaths a year to obesity and warned that if ì[l]eft unabated, . . . 
obesity may soon cause as much preventable disease and death 
as cigarette smoking.î12  In 2004, his estimates were validated by 
a study published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association on the causes of death in the year 2000.  The study 
found that 400,000 deaths were attributable to obesity and 
435,000 were attributable to smoking.13  The study also 
estimated that, absent a sudden reversal in the overweight trend, 
obesity will soon overtake tobacco as the leading cause of death 
in the United States.14  Death, however, is not the only cost of 
obesity.  The Surgeon General estimated direct and indirect costs 
of obesity at approximately $117 billion a year.15  Thus, most 
experts agree that the expenses and consequences linked to 
obesity are significant. 
Therefore, the crux of the current debate on obesity is how to 
assign responsibility for the great harm it causes.  Consumer 
advocates argue that individuals should not be assigned 
responsibility when their outside environment may be the 
determining factor that caused their obesity.16  The argument is 
set out by Yale psychology professor Dr. Kelly Brownell, who 
boldly asserted that ì[i]n the absence of a ëtoxicí food and physical 
activity environment, there would be virtually no obesity.î17  Dr. 
Brownell claims that genetic predisposition to obesity is not the 
cause of obesity.  ì[I]t is clear that genetics may permit obesity to 
occur but a ëtoxicí environment causes it to occur.î18  Dr. Brownell 
cites a report as authoritative from the Institute of Medicine 
which concludes: 
 
 11 David Satcher, Foreword to OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEPíT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERALíS CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND 
DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 2001, at XIII (2001).  But see Jerome P. Kassirer & 
Marcia Angell, Losing WeightóAn Ill-Fated New Yearís Resolution, 338 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 52, 52 (1998) (arguing that the estimate of 300,000 deaths per year in the United 
States caused by obesity is not well established and that it may be ìcalled into question by 
methodologic difficultiesî). 
 12 Satcher, supra note 11, at XIII. 
 13 Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 
JAMA 1238, 1238-40 (2004). 
 14 Id. at 1242. 
 15 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEPíT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE 
SURGEON GENERALíS CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND 
OBESITY 2001, at 10 (2001). 
 16 For example, Ralph Nader likened cheeseburgers to weapons of mass destruction.  
David Wallis, Questions for Ralph Nader: Give Them the Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2002, ß 6 (Magazine), at 13. 
 17 Kelly D. Brownell, The Environment and Obesity, in EATING DISORDERS AND 
OBESITY: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 433, 433 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Kelly D. 
Brownell eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 18 Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
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Although it is clear that genetics has a modest influence on 
obesity on a population basis, by far the largest amount of 
variance in body weight is due to environmental 
influences . . . . The root of the problem, therefore, must lie in 
the powerful social and cultural forces that promote an energy-
rich diet and a sedentary lifestyle.19 
Ultimately, Dr. Brownell identifies two aspects of the American 
ìtoxicî environment that cause obesity.  First, he faults the food 
industry for promoting over-consumption of inexpensive, 
unhealthful food.20  Second, he cites American environmental 
factors that cause declining physical activity.21  The former cause 
is the issue that has recently been litigated in the courts. 
The criticism of the American food industryís contribution to 
an environment that promotes obesity is multifaceted.  
Nutritional experts have criticized the industry for influencing 
dietary and nutritional guidelines.22  Powerful lobbies have 
resisted efforts to clarify nutritional messages sent to the public 
that encourage them to limit sugars and fatty foods.23  The food 
industry has ìuse[d] every means at their disposalólegal, 
regulatory, and societalóto create and protect an environment 
that is conducive to selling their products in a competitive 
marketplace.î24  This influence has resulted in an environment in 
which food advertising disproportionately promotes unhealthful 
products.25  Finally, the food industry has aggressively marketed 
fast-food products to children, the most vulnerable segment of 
society.26 
 
 19 Id.; COMM. TO DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE OUTCOMES OF 
APPROACHES TO PREVENT & TREAT OBESITY, INST. OF MED., WEIGHING THE OPTIONS: 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING WEIGHT-MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 53, 152 (Paul R. Thomas 
ed., 1995). 
 20 Brownell, supra note 17, at 434, 436. 
 21 Id. at 436-37. 
 22 E.g., MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES 
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 67-92 (2002). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 93. 
 25 See Brownell, supra note 17, at 434. 
The yearly marketing budget of McDonaldís is $1.1 billion, and of Coca-Cola, 
$866 million, and these are just two companies.  The budget of the National 
Cancer Institute to promote healthy eating is $1 million.  Advertising for 
healthy [sic] foods versus that for fast foods, soft drinks, and so on, is a drop 
against a tidal wave.  It is not a fair contest, and the outcome, a world with 
diets growing rapidly worse, cannot be considered surprising. 
Id. 
 26 Id. at 436; NESTLE, supra note 22, at 173-218.  The fast-food industry has overtly 
targeted children.  Justice Clarence Thomas took notice of this tactic as recently as three 
years ago by noting that the fast-food inudstry targeted children openly with success. 
Although the growth of obesity over the last few decades has had many causes, 
a significant factor has been the increased availability of large quantities of 
high-calorie, high-fat foods. . . . Such foods, of course, have been aggressively 
ROMERO FINAL - JUNE 1 6/1/2004 1:14 PM 
243 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 7:239 
For the past few years, legal commentators have suggested 
that the many similarities between the tobacco and the fast-food 
industry would eventually expose the fast-food industry to 
liability.27  They have identified several product liability theories 
that could be available to hold the fast-food industry responsible 
for causing obesity.28  Meanwhile, in 2003 and 2004, Congress 
debated whether the fast-food industry should be protected from 
liability and proposed bills limiting the food industryís liability 
for causing obesity.29  One of these bills, the Personal 
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, has passed the House 
and awaits action by the Senate.30  So, the question remains, can 
obesity lawsuits be successful, and, if so, should the fast-food 
industry be protected from liability?  Given the billsí current 
status in Congress, the question of liability remains viable, but 
the potential causes of action are undetermined. 
This comment explores the doctrinal basis for product 
liability for food that causes obesity.  Part II provides a brief 
history of product liability.  Part III discusses the recent 
litigation with McDonaldís.  Part IV explores the causes of action 
that may be brought against the fast-food industry and the 
individual potential for success of each.  It also considers the 
barriers consumer advocates must overcome to hold the fast-food 
industry liable for causing obesity using any of these causes of 
action.  Part V discusses the potential public policy implications 
of a law like that proposed by the Personal Responsibility in Food 
Consumption Act.  Finally, this comment concludes that the food 
industry should not be exempted from liability by further 
Congressional action.  An exemption will not benefit the 
industry, while the threat of liability benefits both the industry 
(by maintaining an environment with sufficient flexibility for the 
success of the fast-food industry) and society (by providing the 
impetus to fashion a remedy for this serious health problem). 
 
marketed and promoted by fast food companies. . . . Moreover, there is 
considerable evidence that they have been successful in changing childrenís 
eating behavior. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587-88 (2001)(Thomas, J. concurring). 
 27 John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food 
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 110-16 (2003); Franklin E. Crawford, Fit for Its 
Ordinary Purpose?  Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1217-23 (2002). 
 28 See Cohan, supra note 27, at 126-28; Crawford, supra note 27, at 1223. 
 29 Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); Personal 
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003); Small Business 
Liability Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2813, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 30 The Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act was passed on March 10, 
2003 by a vote of 276 to 139.  Final Vote Results for Roll Call 54, http://clerk.
house.gov/evs/2004/roll054.xml (last visited Apr. 5, 2004). 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
Product liability law is of relatively recent origin.  One 
hundred years ago, consumers suing to recover damages caused 
by a defective product could recover only if they could prove the 
manufacturer was negligent and that they were in privity (i.e., 
they had personally purchased the product).  In the landmark 
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., then Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals revolutionized product 
liability by substantially abolishing the privity rule when danger 
was foreseeable.31  MacPherson established that privity was not 
determinative of liability when there was negligence.  According 
to Judge Cardozo, ìIf [the manufacturer] is negligent, where 
danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow.î32  In addition, 
Judge Cardozo expanded product liability beyond the limitations 
imposed by contracts and based it on public policy.33 
Over the next forty years, courts further dissolved the 
contract limitations placed on product liability.  No longer relying 
on express warranties, the courts allowed non-privity plaintiffs to 
recover on implied warranty claims.  In the case of Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the court held manufacturers strictly 
liable under an ìimplied warranty that [the product] is 
reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands 
of the ultimate purchaser.î34  Under this theory, consumers were 
protected from defective products that did not meet their 
expectations. 
Subsequently, many courts began interpreting product 
liability in terms of strict liability in tort rather than in the 
contract theory of implied warranty.35  Dean William L. Prosser 
had a significant role in effecting this change by drafting section 
 
 31 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).  MacPherson involved a lawsuit against Buick 
for negligence in purchasing defective wheels which caused the plaintiffís accident.  The 
plaintiff was not in privity because he purchased his Buick from a dealer rather than from 
a manufacturer.  Id.; CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: 
DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 173-84 (2001) (giving a 
brief but insightful description of the MacPherson case). 
 32 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
 33 Id.  ìWe have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb . . . 
grows out of contract and nothing else.  We have put the source of the obligation where it 
ought to be.  We have put its source in the law.î  Id.  See also BOGUS, supra note 31, at 
184. 
 34 161 A.2d 69, 84 (N.J. 1960).  Henningsen involves the sale of a new Plymouth 
sedan that was driven for less than 500 miles before it inexplicably veered into a wall 
after an apparent failure of the steering mechanism.  Although the contract contained 
warranty disclaimers and clauses indicating that the contract was the entire agreement, 
the court found the defendant liable under an implied warranty theory rather than 
negligence because the car had been so badly damaged that it was impossible to 
determine if the manufacturer had been negligent.  Id. at 73-75, 84. 
 35 BOGUS, supra note 31, at 185. 
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402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.36  Section 402A stated 
in part: ìOne who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused . . . .î37  In essence, section 402A abolished privity and 
made manufacturers liable for physical injuries caused by their 
defective products regardless of fault.38  Courts rationalized this 
change by emphasizing three theoriesómanufacturers could be 
held liable because they were enterprises that could: spread costs 
of liability, be encouraged to make safer products, and be held 
responsible because they had represented their products as 
safe.39 
As section 402A became accepted, courts assigned 
manufacturer liability for three types of defects: ì(1) 
manufacturing defects or production flaws, (2) design defects, 
and (3) information or warning defects.î40  The first type of 
defect, manufacturing, is the result of ìflaws or irregularities in 
products arising from errors in production.î41  The seller is 
subject to liability if the ìproductís condition is dangerous in a 
manner not intended by the seller nor expected by the 
consumer.î42  An example of a manufacturing defect is the 
Bridgestone/Firestone tire failures on Ford Explorers that 
ìprobably resulted in part from various irregularities in the 
production process.î43  The second type of defect, design, ìoccurs 
when the intended design of the product line itself is inadequate 
and needlessly dangerous.î44  The seller is liable for products 
with design defects because there is ìan unreasonably dangerous 
aspect or feature of the product.î45  The quintessential example of 
a design flaw is Fordís infamous exploding Pintos with 
 
 36 Id. at 186.  ìThis Restatement section was to be cited in more than three thousand 
court opinions and, in one fashion or another, to become accepted by every American 
jurisdiction.î  Id. at 185. 
 37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 402A (1965). 
 38 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS ß 353, at 974-75 (2000). 
 39 Id. at 975-76. 
 40 Id. ß 354, at 979. 
 41 David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 852 (2002). 
 42 Id. at 893. 
 43 Id. at 852-53 & n.6.  See also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a tire products liability action was not manageable as a 
nationwide class action); In re Bridgeston/Firestone, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1156 
(S.D. Ind. 2002) (refusing to dismiss a product liability suit on forum non conveniens 
grounds brough by victims of vehicular accidents in Venezuela and Columbia).  See 
generally Public Citizen and Safetyforum.com, Spinning Their Wheels: How Ford and 
Firestone Fail to Justify the Limited Tire Recall (providing background information on the 
dispute), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF266.pdf (last visited May 29, 2004). 
 44 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 355, at 980. 
 45 Bogus, supra note 31, at 193. 
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unprotected rear gas tanks.46  Liability is extended to protect 
society from the harmful effects of the unsafe features of these 
products.  Finally, warning defects occur when products become 
unreasonably dangerous because ìno information explains their 
use or warns of their dangers.î47  Liability is extended to 
manufacturers because these products could be reasonably safe if 
accompanied by adequate information or warnings.48  For 
example, a company may not manufacture full strength glucose 
in a bottle without a warning to parents to dilute the product 
because it is dangerous to babies without dilution.49 
In 1998, the American Law Institute promulgated the 
Products Liabilities section of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
which clearly defined these three types of defects.50  In addition, 
it rejected the use of a ìconsumer expectationî test as the 
standard for determining design defectiveness except in cases 
involving food products.51  Instead, the risk-utility test was 
adopted,52 which requires courts to ìattempt to balance the risks 
of the product as designed against the costs of making the 
product safer.î53  When applying this test, courts often refer to 
the following seven factors listed by Dean John Wade: 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product . . . . (2) The 
safety aspects of the product ñ the likelihood that it will cause 
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.  (3) The 
availability of a substitute product . . . . (4) The manufacturerís 
ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product . . . . (5) 
The userís ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care . . . . 
(6) The userís anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in 
the product and their avoidability . . . . (7) The feasibility, on 
the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss . . . .54 
Because these factors so closely resemble negligence, product 
liability for design defects is often considered to be equivalent to 
liability for negligence.55 
 
 
 46 Id. at 190-93;  Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1981). 
 47 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 355, at 981. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.; Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986). 
 50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 2. 
 51 Id. ß 2 cmt. g.  ìWith regard to two special product categories [food products and 
used products] consumer expectations play a special role in determining product defect.î  
Id. ß 2 cmt. h. 
 52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 2 cmt. a. 
 53 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 357, at 985. 
 54 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L. 
REV. 825, 837 (1973). 
 55 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 357, at 986-87. 
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Finally, one commentator argues that we are now reaching a 
new level of product liability called generic liability or product 
category liability.56  Generic product liability results ì[w]hen a 
product remains unreasonably dangerous despite the best 
possible design, construction, and warnings.î57  Because the 
product ìgenerically fail[s] a risk-utility test,î the manufacturer 
is made liable because the productís risks outweigh its benefits.58  
The commentator asserts that liability imposed on gun and 
tobacco manufacturers falls under this concept.59 
This brief history demonstrates the breadth of perspectives 
that must be brought to a discussion of product liability for fast 
food.  As noted above, product liability involves elements of 
contract, intentional torts, negligence, strict tort liability, and 
public policy.  The following analysis of fast-food litigation 
explores the McDonaldís litigation within this context and then 
extends that analysis to future cases. 
III. MCDONALDíS LITIGATION 
In August 2002, McDonaldís Corporation was sued in the 
Supreme Court of New York, Bronx County, by the parents of 
two overweight children.60  The parents claimed their children 
were ìconsumers who [had] purchased and consumed 
[McDonaldís] products and, as a result thereof, [had] become 
overweight and [had] developed diabetes, coronary heart 
disease, . . . and/or other detrimental and adverse health effects 
as a result of the [McDonaldís] conduct and business practices.î61  
McDonaldís removed the action to federal court and then filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.62 
A. First Motion to Dismiss Complaint 
The individual counts against McDonaldís were a mixture of 
both intentional and negligent torts.  The first two counts were 
for intentionally violating the New York Consumer Protection 
Act (New York Gen. Bus. Law sections 349 and 350) among other 
statutes.63  Count one alleged that McDonaldís misled its 
customers in marketing campaigns by representing their 
products as nutritious and by not disclosing both their 
 
 56 BOGUS, supra note 31, at 193-96. 
 57 Id. at 195. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 195-96. 
 60 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d. 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 520. 
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ingredients (products high in cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar) and 
the detrimental effects of these ingredients.64  Count two alleged 
that McDonaldís also used these same deceptive marketing 
techniques to target children.65  The third and fifth counts were 
based on negligence.  Count three alleged negligence for selling 
products causing obesity, and count five alleged McDonaldís 
negligently marketed addictive food products.66  Finally, count 
four was based on an allegation that McDonaldís failed to warn of 
the addictive properties of its foods.67 
As to the first two counts, McDonaldís argued that, because 
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (ìNLEAî) 
exempts the restaurant industry from federal labeling 
requirements, McDonaldís could not be held liable under New 
York state law for their failure to provide nutritional 
information.68  Under the NLEA, most packaged foods must be 
labeled with nutritional information.69  Thus, most food 
manufacturing industries are protected against claims that a 
food product caused their obesity because consumers had an 
explicit warning of the content of the food they ate.  Restaurants, 
on the other hand, are specifically exempt from such labeling 
requirements.70  Therefore, McDonaldís argument runs, federal 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 525-26.  See also 21 U.S.C. ß 343(q) (2003). 
 69 21 U.S.C. ß 343(q)(1). 
 70 21 U.S.C. ß 343(q)(5)(A)(i).  The pre-exemption statute, 21 U.S.C. 343-1(a)(4), 
requires that the states not interfere directly or indirectly with the federal laws and 
regulations dealing with nutritional labeling of packaged food.  Yet, the statute also 
allows the states to establish whatever nutritional labeling requirements they wish for 
those foods exempt under the act; in our case, restaurant food.  The preemption section 
also applies to nutrient and health claims made by restaurants.  Any cause of action 
based on a nutrient or health claim should have been preempted.  According to the Code 
of Federal Regulations:  
[t]he following foods are exempt from this section . . . (2) Food products which 
are: (i) served in restaurants,  Provided, That the food bears no nutrition 
claims or other nutrition information in any context on the label or in labeling 
or advertising.  Claims or other nutrition subject the food to the provisions of 
this section. 
Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. ß 101.9(j) (2003).  The court later addresses a 
potential claim that customers could maintain a well-balanced diet eating at McDonaldís 
everyday.  If interpreted as a health claim, this claim should have been preempted.  The 
courtís citation to the Federal Register indicating states were allowed to regulate ìunder 
their own consumer protection laws . . . menus [from] provid[ing] false or misleading 
informationî was true but slightly misleading.  Pelman, at 526 (citing Food Labeling; 
General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2517 (Jan. 6, 
1993)).  Just three years after the courtís citation, the court would have found a clearer 
exposition of the preemptive provisions in the Federal Register.   
The provision on nutrition labeling . . . includes an exemption for foods that are 
served or sold in restaurants . . .  (section 403(q)(5)(A)(i)). This exemption, 
however, is contingent on there being no claims or other nutrition information 
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law preempts any state law regulating the labeling of food 
products.  The court did not agree.  The NLEA permits states to 
impose labeling requirements for certain food industries that are 
exempt under the act, including the restaurant industry. 71  In 
fact, the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted the 
NLEA as permitting the states to enact laws protecting 
consumers from menus with ìfalse or misleading information.î72  
Consequently, the court held that the federal labeling laws did 
not protect McDonaldís from plaintiffsí New York state law 
claims.73 
The court, therefore, addressed the first two counts of 
misleading advertisements by following the interpretive 
requirements for New York statutes.74  The New York Consumer 
Protection Act75 requires the plaintiff plead with specificity any 
ìdeceptive acts or practices that form the basis of a claim.î76  The 
court cited as examples of deceptive acts or practices public 
statements made by the tobacco industry in which they denied: 
that there is a causal link between disease and tobacco, that 
cigarettes are addictive, and that they manipulated nicotine to 
regulate cigarette addictiveness.77  Ultimately, the plaintiffs were 
not successful because they did not provide equivalent examples 
of such practices by McDonaldís.  Their complaint did not identify 
one single deceptive act toward consumers or their children.78  
The complaint also failed to show that McDonaldís decision not to 
post its nutritional information was a deceptive omission.79  
Accordingly, these plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of 
deception to the court.80 
The court then considered whether additional 
advertisements and McDonaldís statements on their website 
were deceptive.81  These advertisements either encouraged the 
 
on the label or labeling, or in the advertising, for the food. The use of nutrient 
content claims, health claims, or other nutrition information on the label or 
labeling of a food sold in a restaurant or other establishment in which food is 
served for immediate consumption will subject that food to the nutrition 
labeling provisions of the act (see sections 403(q) and (r) of the act and 
ß101.9(j)(2)(i) through (j)(2)(iii) (21 CFR 101.9 (j)(2)(i) through (j)(2)(iii))). 
Food Labeling; Nutrient Content Claims and Health Claims; Restaurant Foods, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 40320 (1996). 
 71 21 U.S.C. ß 343-1(a)(4). 
 72 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ßß 349-50 (2004). 
 76 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 77 Id. at 526-27. 
 78 Id. at 527, 530. 
 79 Id. at 529. 
 80 Id. at 527, 530. 
 81 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28. 
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public to eat at McDonaldís every day or asked the public to 
make McDonaldís meals part of a balanced diet.82  Although 
claims based on these statements could have survived the motion 
to dismiss for lack of specificity, the court noted that the 
statements were likely not deceptive.83  According to the court, a 
reasonable consumer would not have been misled by McDonaldís 
conduct.84  Furthermore, the statements were not made in 
conjunction, so McDonaldís never asserted that eating their 
products every day would constitute a well-balanced diet.85  The 
court contrasts this practice with that of Subway, which has 
made some implied health claims.86  McDonaldís advertisements 
ìencouraging consumers to eat its products ëeverydayí is mere 
puffery . . . in the absence of a claim that to do so will result in a 
specific effect on health.î87  As a result, the court concluded that 
these statements were not misleading.88 
Conversely, the court did characterize some older 
McDonaldís advertising as deceptive.89  This, however, was not 
helpful to the plaintiffs because the court was careful to note that 
these advertisements would likely be barred by statutes of 
limitations.90  For instance, one advertisement claimed that 
ìsodium is down across the menu,î when it was not.91  Another 
advertisement did not disclose the presence of preservatives 
when it discussed the ingredients in its shakes.  The 
advertisement finished by saying ìthatís all,î implying there were 
no additional ingredients.92  Each of these ads is deceptive on its 
face.  Nonetheless, the court considered them only to assist the 
 
 82 Id. at 527. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. at 525, 528. 
 85 Id. at 527-28. 
 86 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 528 n.15 (describing Subwayís advertising campaign 
claiming that its product is a ìhealthier alternative to fatty fast foodî and highlighting the 
dietary accomplishments of Jared Fogle, who lost 235 pounds on a diet of two daily meals 
at Subway for a year and has been featured in Subway commercials).  Yet Subwayís press 
releases do not specifically endorse Jaredís diet nor do they explicitly claim that a Subway 
diet is a healthy diet.  For example, one press release indicated that ìSubway Corporate 
Dietician Lanette Roulier stresses that the chain does not endorse the ëJared Dietí.î  Press 
Release, Subway, (December 2000), http://www.subway.com/Publishing/PubRelations/
PressRelease/pr-011101j.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).  Furthermore, Subwayís website 
contains a disclaimer that Jaredís weight loss program included exercise and that his 
results are not typical.  Subway website, Jaredís Statistics, http://subway.com/subway
root/MenuNutrition/Jared/jaredStats.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (ìIndividuals lost 
weight by exercising and eating a balanced, reduced-calorie diet that included SUBWAYÆ 
sandwiches with 6 grams of fat or less.  Their results are not typical.î). 
 87 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
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plaintiffs in shaping any future claim.93 
The court emphasized that McDonaldís could only be held 
liable for failing to post nutritional labeling on its products if that 
omission was deceptive.94  According to the court, businesses do 
not have a duty to inform each individual customer of 
information relevant to that consumerís use of the product unless 
the business alone possesses ìmaterial information.î95  The 
plaintiffs had never alleged that nutritional content ìwas solely 
within McDonaldsí [sic] possession or that a consumer could not 
reasonably obtain such information.î96  Absent a claim that 
McDonaldís held nutritional information the public could not 
access, McDonaldís failure to post nutritional information was 
not deceptive.97 
B. Common Law Claims 
In count three, the plaintiffs claimed that McDonaldís 
negligently manufactured and sold products causing obesity and 
failed to warn its consumers of the inherent danger of their 
products.  The court dismissed the claim holding that the 
plaintiffs had neither established a duty of the defendants nor 
shown that the defendantís actions were the proximate cause of 
their childrenís obesity.98 
The court first addressed plaintiffsí failure to show a duty.  
The plaintiffs alleged that McDonaldís products were inherently 
dangerous as formulated, with ìhigh levels of cholesterol, fat, salt 
and sugar,î and that McDonaldís, therefore, had a duty to warn 
its consumers of these dangers.99  McDonaldís counteredó
framing the issue as one of misuse through over-consumption 
rather than inherent dangeróclaiming that it had no duty to 
protect consumers from dangers caused by the over-consumption 
of its food when the public is well aware of such dangers.100  
McDonaldís based its claims on a comment to section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all 
consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some 
risk of harm, if only from over-consumption.  Ordinary sugar is 
a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under 
Mussolini as an instrument of torture.  That is not what is 
 
 93 Id. at 528. 
 94 Id. at 529. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
 97 See id. 
 98 Id. at 530-40. 
 99 Id. at 531. 
 100 Id. at 531-32. 
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meant by ìunreasonably dangerousî in this Section.  The 
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who 
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics. . . . Good tobacco is not 
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking 
may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like 
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.  Good butter is not 
unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it 
deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; 
but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is 
unreasonably dangerous.101 
The court agreed with McDonaldís over-consumption analysis 
and concluded that any product liability ìbased on over-
consumption is doomed if the consequences of such over-
consumption are common knowledge.î102  On the other hand, he 
noted that tobacco was also mentioned in the comment as a 
product with well-known dangers and this did not bar tobacco 
liability because tobacco companies had intentionally altered 
nicotine levels to induce addiction.103  Thus, McDonaldís could be 
liable only if its products were ìso extraordinarily unhealthy that 
they are outside the reasonable contemplation of the consuming 
public or that the products are so extraordinarily unhealthy as to 
be dangerous in their intended use.î104  The plaintiffsí claims 
could not pass this bar. 
The court then turned to the question of proximate cause.  
The court reasoned that based on the complaint, a jury would be 
required to engage in ìwild speculationî to find that McDonaldís 
caused the obesity.105  The complaint did not specify how often 
the child plaintiffs ate at McDonaldís.106  McDonaldís products 
would cause the plaintiffsí obesity only if the plaintiffs ate at 
McDonaldís frequently enough to establish a ìsignificant role in 
the plaintiffsí health problems.î107  In addition, the complaint 
included articles that identified other factors that contributed to 
plaintiffsí obesity.108  To successfully prove proximate cause, the 
plaintiffs would have to address or eliminate these factors.109  
Since the plaintiffs did not address these deficiencies, the court 
 
 101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 402A cmt. i (1965). 
 102 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 538. 
 106 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d. at 538.  However, in a footnote the court noted that the 
plaintiffs later attached affidavits stating how often the plaintiffs ate at McDonaldís.  Id. 
at 538 n.28. 
 107 Id. at 538-39. 
 108 Id. at 539. 
 109 Id. 
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held proximate cause was a barrier that prevented negligence 
liability.110 
According to the court, its decision to dismiss the claims 
based on negligence was consistent with some basic policy 
principles.  Primarily, ìit is not the place of the law to protect 
[the consumers] from their own excesses.î111  Furthermore, it is 
not the courtís role to interfere when the ìconsumer exercises free 
choice with appropriate knowledgeî as long as the manufacturer 
does not intentionally ìmask[] . . . information necessary to make 
the choice.î112 
The court also addressed four additional common law 
arguments raised outside the complaint to assess whether the 
plaintiffs could make an adequate argument for duty in an 
amended complaint, and identified two that could have 
potential.113  First, the plaintiffs had argued that McDonaldís 
processed their products to the point that they were more 
dangerous than what a reasonable consumer could expect from 
an unprocessed product.114  This argument had potential because 
any additional danger would be latent rather than patent unless 
the public was also aware of the danger of this additional 
processing.115  Second, a modified argument based on McDonaldís 
knowledge of consumersí potential misuse could have merit.116  
The modified argument would have merit if McDonaldís should 
have been aware that its consumers intended to eat at 
McDonaldís ìfor every meal of every dayî and if McDonaldís was 
also aware that this frequency of consumption was unreasonably 
dangerous.117  On the other hand, a claim based on over-
consumption rather than exclusive consumption at McDonaldís 
would likely fail due to the courtís prior analysis. 
Counts four and five were based on McDonaldís failure to 
warn its consumers.  Count four alleged that McDonaldís failed 
to warn of the unhealthy attributes of its products and failed on 
the same principles as count three.  To prove McDonaldís failed 
to warn, the plaintiffs had to prove the defendant had a duty to 
warn.  However, the plaintiffs neglected to establish such a duty 
 
 110 Id. at 539-40. 
 111 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 533. 
 114 Id. at 534-35.  ìFor instance, Chicken McNuggets, rather than being merely 
chicken fried in a pan, are a McFrankenstein creation of various elements not utilized by 
the home cook.î  Id. at 535. 
 115 Id. at 534. 
 116 Id. at 537. 
 117 Id. 
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in the complaint.118  The court cited a number of factors involved 
in assessing whether there was a duty to warn including: the 
ìfeasibility and difficulty of issuing a warning . . . ;î the 
ìobviousness of the risk from actual use of the product;î the 
ìknowledge of the . . . user; and proximate cause.î119  The court 
also recognized that proximate cause would be precluded if a 
danger was obvious.120  Therefore, the court dismissed this count 
because the complaint failed to allege ìMcDonaldís products . . . 
were dangerous in any way other than that which was open and 
obvious to a reasonable consumer.î121 
Finally, the court addressed count five, which alleged that 
McDonaldís failed to warn of the addictive properties of its 
products.  The court noted that the complaint did not specify that 
the plaintiffs themselves were addicted nor did it explain how 
McDonaldís products were involved in causing this addiction.122  
As it stood, the complaint was ìoverly vague.î123  The court 
dismissed this count for its failure to allege the ìaddictive nature 
of McDonaldís foodsî and its failure to allege that their food was 
the proximate cause of the plaintiffsí obesity.124 
In summary, the plaintiffsí initial complaint was dismissed 
for lack of specificity.  In the first counts, the plaintiffsí failed to 
allege specific acts of deception toward consumers or toward child 
plaintiffs.  In the subsequent claims, the plaintiffs were unable to 
specify why the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs to not 
make products that were dangerous if over-consumed, or why the 
defendant owed a duty to warn of obvious dangers. 
The decision in this case was guided by the principle that 
McDonaldís should be held liable only if its ìproducts involve a 
danger that is not within the common knowledge of 
consumers.î125  However, the court also recognized that 
government has a responsibility to protect individuals ìin those 
situations where individuals are somehow unable to protect 
themselves and where society needs to provide a buffer between 
the individual and some other entityówhether herself, another 
individual or a behemoth corporation that spans the globe.î126  
Ultimately, the court determined that these principles ìrequire 
the complaint to be dismissed for lack of specificity,î with leave to 
 
 118 Id. at 540-41. 
 119 Pelman, 237 F. Supp 2d. at 540. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 541. 
 122 Id. at 542. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Pelman, 237 F. Supp 2d. at 542-43. 
 125 Id. at 518. 
 126 Id. at 516. 
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amend,127 which was essentially a public policy decision based on 
personal responsibility. 
C. Amended Complaint 
After the first complaint was dismissed, the plaintiffs re-filed 
an amended complaint with claims dealing exclusively with the 
New York Consumer Protection Act.128  The three counts were 
constructed to conform to the dicta in the prior dismissal.  For 
example, count one alleged that the plaintiffs were misled into 
believing McDonaldís products ìwere nutritious . . . and/or easily 
part of a healthy lifestyle if consumed on a daily basis.î129  Count 
two alleged that McDonaldís failed to disclose that their foods 
were substantially less healthy than they appeared because of 
additives and further processing.130  Count three alleged that 
McDonaldís claimed that it provided nutritional information 
adequately, which in reality it did not.131  Ultimately, this 
amended complaint was likewise dismissed because the 
plaintiffsí allegations still did not demonstrate that the 
defendantís actions or deception caused them injury.132 
Unfortunately, much of the plaintiffsí case for deception 
rested on old advertisements; thus, the claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations.133  The plaintiffs attempted to argue a 
variety of theories to toll the statute of limitations, including the 
ìcontinuing practice exception,î134 the ìseparate accrual rule,î135 
the ìdiligence-discovery accrual rule,î136 and infancy tolling.137  
However, the court discarded the first three of these theories, 
leaving only infancy tolling.138  This presented its own difficulty 
 
 127 Id. at 519. 
 128 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 3, 2003). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at *14. 
 133 Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *4-6. 
 134 The continuing practice exception requires a tolling after ìeach successive 
deceptive statement in furtherance of [an] overall scheme.î  Id. at *5. 
 135 The separate accrual rule creates a limitation period every time ìa plaintiff 
discovers, or should have discovered a new injury caused by the . . . violations.î  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 136 Under the diligence-discovery accrual rule, ìaccrual may be postponed until the 
plaintiff has or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the critical facts of both 
his injury and its cause.î  Id. at *5 (citation omitted). 
 137 Id. at *6.  Under infancy tolling, a cause of action is tolled while a person is ìunder 
a disability because of infancy.î  Id. (citation omitted). 
 138 Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *5-6.  The court discarded the first of these 
theories as disfavored; found the second theory did not apply because no new injuries 
were alleged which did not result from the initial injury; and found the third theory did 
not apply because the facts about McDonaldís products were ìwell knownî such that the 
plaintiffs should have known the ìcritical facts of their injury.î  Id. 
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since the court refused to consider advertisements observed only 
by the parents, allowing only those actually seen by the 
children.139 
This led to the second difficulty faced by the plaintiffs.  
Because the child plaintiffs had not seen many of the 
advertisements, they could not prove they relied on the 
advertisements.140  As a result, the plaintiffs failed to ìallege in 
general terms that plaintiffs were aware of the false 
advertisement, and that they relied to their detriment on the 
advertisement.î141  The only ìdeceptive actî of which the infant 
plaintiffs were even aware was McDonaldís statement that they 
were switching to 100% vegetable oil to fry their potatoes and 
hash browns and that these products would contain zero 
milligrams of cholesterol.142  After an analysis of this 
advertisement, the court found the complaint sufficient to allege 
reliance on this alleged misrepresentation.143 
The court then addressed causation, the more difficult 
obstacle to the plaintiffsí case.  Although the plaintiffs did not 
need to prove proximate cause as they would in a negligence 
case, they did have to prove that the deceptive act caused their 
injuries.144  Although the plaintiffs had, ìalbeit just barely,î 
established a causal connection between the ìdeceptive actsî and 
the decision to eat at McDonaldís, the court held that they did not 
establish an ìadequate causal connection between their 
consumption of McDonaldís food and their alleged injuries.î145  
Unfortunately, yet again, the plaintiffs had failed to eliminate 
other factors that could have caused their obesity.146  For 
example, they did not address such questions as, ìWhat else did 
the [minors] eat?  How much did they exercise?  Is there a family 
history of the diseases?î147  Therefore, the court concluded that 
there was insufficient information to determine whether 
McDonaldís alleged deception caused the plaintiffsí injuries or if 
it was only a contributing factor.148 
In the final analysis, from the courtís opening statement 
focusing on plaintiffsí knowledge, it was clear that Pelman would 
be decided in McDonaldís favor.  Ultimately, the plaintiffsí case 
 
 139 Id. at *6. 
 140 Id. at *8. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at *9. 
 143 Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *9. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at *11. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *11. 
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unraveled because they were unable to produce specific 
incidences of recent deception and because the dangers of over 
consumption were obvious.  Beyond even these difficulties, they 
provided no evidence that McDonaldís actions caused their 
injury. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF FAST-FOOD LITIGATION 
Proponents of liability for the fast-food industry will not give 
up so easily.  Professor John Banzhaf III, one of the leading 
proponents, has expressed a willingness to continue to litigate 
against the fast-food industry even after Pelman.149  In June of 
2003, Professor Banzhaf chided Congress for considering a bill 
restricting fast-food liability.150  He boldly asserted that fast-food 
companies should be found liable under ìa wide variety of 
different legal theories, different pieces of evidence, many of 
which you have not seen.î151  Professor Banzhaf joins others who 
believe the fast-food industry will one day be held liable under a 
currently non-existent theory.152  While this may be true, 
traditional theories should not be abandoned yet.  The next 
section focuses on known theories and policy implications.  
Specifically, it explores product liability causes of action 
currently used to hold manufacturers liable for harm caused by 
their products.  It details the barriers common to most of these 
theories and discusses how those barriers might be problematic 
in the context of fast-food litigation.  Finally, it suggests some 
new theories that may be used in the future to hold the food 
industry liable for its actions. 
A. Potential Causes of Action: Product Liability 
Modern plaintiffs can sue under a number of product liability 
 
 149 See John F. Banzhaf III, Dismissal of McDonaldís Obesity Law Suit was Expected: 
Four Wins, One Loss, and Several Legal Theories Yet to Go, at http://banzhaf.net/docs/
mcd2no.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).  See generally John F. Banzhaf III, Using Legal 
Action to Help Fight Obesity, at http://banzhaf.net/obesitylinks (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).  
For example, one of the lead headlines at this website is ìFlash: McDonaldís Case 
Dismissed, But Anti-Fat Lawyers Arenít Discouraged.î 
 150 ìWith all due respect, shame on you.  If it ainít broke, donít fix it, especially until 
Congress is prepared to step in and adopt comprehensive legislation and save taxpayers 
some 50 billion annually in obesity costs.î  Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption 
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 9 (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary (statement of 
Professor John Banzhaf, George Washington University School of Law). 
 151 Id. at 10. 
 152 ìAnd the public, according to recent surveys, is about willing to hold them liable.  
There is liability now.  Juries are about to hold them liable as they are in tobacco suits.î  
Id.  See also, Cohan, supra note 27, at 131 (ìThe fate of obesity litigation may rest at least 
in part upon the ability of judges to fashion new tort doctrines, a phenomenon that has 
progressed steadily throughout the past century.î). 
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theories.153  The basis for the suit may be intentional torts, 
contract, strict liability, or negligence.  Intentional torts cover 
product liability for misrepresentation, while the rules of contract 
liability cover claims based on express or implied warranty.  Tort 
liability for unreasonably defective products falls under strict 
liability.  Negligence encompasses defects in manufacturing, 
negligent marketing and selling, and failing to warn of dangers.  
While the theories are similar in some aspects, each presents its 
own obstacles to plaintiffs. 
1. Intentional Tort: Misrepresentation 
Pelman was essentially decided under a theory of 
misrepresentation based on the New York Consumer Protection 
Act.  Misrepresentation is usually a fact-intensive inquiry and 
requires that the plaintiff allege reliance upon the 
misrepresentation.154  In Pelman, the plaintiffs failed to show 
personal reliance, and this difficulty is likely to recur in future 
fast-food litigation based on misrepresentation, given the 
relatively slow onset of obesity155 and the difficulty of pinpointing 
the specific advertisements that caused plaintiffs to eat 
particular products.  The slow onset of obesity further presents 
problems with statutes of limitations.  Therefore, the success of 
such cases, mayóas proponents have suggestedóbe dependent 
on finding a theory approved by the court that will toll the 
statute of limitations. 
These obstacles are significant.  However, plaintiffs should 
not wholly abandon the theory of misrepresentation.  It is 
possible in some cases to allege misrepresentation based upon 
intentional omissions, although the original complaint in Pelman 
shows the hazards of such an approach.  In Pelman, the court 
dismissed misrepresentation claims because the public had 
access to the same nutritional information as McDonaldís.156  An 
allegation based on failing to disclose a substance that consumers 
do not expect is likely to find more success in courts.  For 
example, in California, fast-food companies were sued for failing 
to disclose the presence of acrylamide, a substance linked to 
 
 153 See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. 1995) (holding it was 
possible to find a plaintiff liable for a breach of an implied warranty when a claim of strict 
products liability was not satisfied); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 668 
(Tex. 1999) (holding that ì[p]laintiffs are generally entitled to obtain findings that will 
support alternative theories of recoveryî in strict product liability and implied warranty 
claims). 
 154 See Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 352, at 971. 
 155 Scott M. Grundy, Multifactorial Causation of Obesity: Implications for Prevention, 
67 AM. J. CLIN. NUTR. 563S, 565S (1998). 
 156 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d. 512, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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cancer.157  Courts recognize a distinction between obvious natural 
components of food and those that the consumers would not 
reasonably expect to find in their food.158  Yet, absent a 
conclusive showing that fast-food companies added a ìsecretî 
ingredient that causes obesity, an obesity claim based on 
misrepresentation by a deceptive omission will most likely fail. 
2. Contract: Express Warranty 
Under the law of contracts, plaintiffs may claim that a 
merchant breached an express or implied warranty.159  Liability 
for a breach of warranty on the sale of goods is governed by 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.160  Claims for breach 
of an express warranty would be similar to claims of 
misrepresentation and would arise where the fast-food producer 
made claims that the food had specific health benefits.  For 
example, as described in Pelman, an advertisement that 
represented that patrons could lose weight or receive certain 
health benefits by eating at certain restaurants every day would 
be an express warranty.161  However, success under this theory is 
questionable because fast-food companies rarely represent that 
eating their food would not cause obesity or would provide such 
benefits (and they are certainly less likely to do so after Pelman).  
Furthermore, the federal government regulates health and 
nutrient claims made by restaurants.162  A consumer who sues a 
 
 157 Cohan, supra note 27, at 122-23.  Acrylamide is relevant to obesity liability 
because it was initially shown to be present in high levels in fast foods such as fried 
potatoes.  However, recent research has found acrylamide present not only in fast foods 
but also in other nutritious foods.  Thus, it is probably impossible at this time to avoid 
acrylamide.  In a meeting convened to discuss acrylamide, Deputy FDA Commissioner, 
Dr. Lester Crawford noted that fast foods are not the only foods to contain acrylamide.  
ìThe exposure assessment has found that many foods contribute to acrylamide exposure.  
No single food accounts for the majority of acrylamide exposure for the U.S. population.î  
Lester Crawford, Transcript of Proceedings Food Advisory Committee, February 24-25, 
2003 Meeting Acrylamide, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/ acrytra2.html (last visited Mar. 
8, 2004).  Further data for acrylamide in food can be found at either the World Health 
Organization web site, http://www.who.int/foodsafety
/chem/chemicals/acrylamide/en/, or its infonet on acrylamide, http://www.acrylamide-
food.org/.  See also Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, Pesticides, Metals, Chemical Contaminants & Natural Toxins, at 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/pestadd.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004). 
 158 Owen, supra note 41, at 897-98. 
 159 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 352, at 971. 
 160 U.C.C.  ßß 2- 313,-314,-315 (2003) (providing for an express warranty, implied 
warranty of merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose for 
both merchants and consumers in particular circumstances). 
 161 In Pelman, the plaintiffs contended that McDonaldís encouraged its customers to 
eat everyday as part of a balanced diet.  Apparently, this claim did not rise to the level of 
a warranty.  See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. 
 162 Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. ß 101.10 (2003) (ìNutrition labeling in accordance with 
ß 101.9 shall be provided upon request for any restaurant food or meal for which a 
nutrient content claim . . . or a health claim . . . is made . . . .î).  See also Food and Drugs, 
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restaurant for an unsupported health or nutrient claim must 
show that the restaurant did not comply with the NLEA.163  
Therefore, many, if not all, express warranty claims based on 
restaurant nutrient or health claims would be preempted by the 
NLEA.  Given these difficulties, it is unlikely that consumers 
seeking to hold fast-food restaurants liable based on breach of an 
express warranty would be successful unless the restaurant 
failed to comply with the NLEA. 
3. Contract: Implied Warranty 
Fast-food companies could also be held liable for breaching 
the implied warranty of merchantability.  Essentially, the 
implied warranty of merchantability defined in U.C.C. section 2-
314 is ìthe sellerís implied promise that the goods sold in a 
contract of sale will work.î164  Claims based on the breach of the 
implied warranty depend heavily on a courtís interpretation of 
merchantability because the U.C.C. provides only a list of 
ìminimum qualities goods must possess in order to be 
merchantable.î165 
The recent tobacco litigation provides an instructive analogy.  
In the tobacco cases, courts defined merchantability in two 
manners.  Some courts found cigarettes unmerchantable if 
plaintiff could prove cigarettes were ìcommercially unfit or 
unsuitable for smoking.î166  Other courts held that cigarettes 
were unmerchantable simply because their use could result in 
great personal injury.167  In American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 
the Supreme Court of Texas went further.168  There the court 
held that the product would only be unmerchantable if it 
contained a health danger that was not in the common 
knowledge.169  The court held that the danger of nicotine 
addiction was not in the common knowledge of most consumers 
in 1952 when the plaintiff began smoking.170  However, that 
danger was within the knowledge of the tobacco industry and, 
therefore, was sufficient to prove the unmerchantability of the 
product and the subsequent liability of the industry.171 
 
21 C.F.R. ßß 101.13-.14 (2003). 
 163 Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. ß 101.9 (j) (2003). 
 164 Crawford, supra note 27, at 1170. 
 165 Id. at 1173. 
 166 Id. at 1199-1200 (quoting Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 70, 94 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 167 Id. at 1200. 
 168 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997). 
 169 Id. at 435.  Crawford, supra note 27, at 1201. 
 170 951 S.W.2d at 435. 
 171 Id. at 429- 31 (ìAddiction is a danger apart from the direct physical dangers of 
smoking because the addictive nature of cigarettes multiplies the likelihood of and 
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In light of these theories of merchantability, assignment of 
liability to the fast-food industry under an implied warranty 
theory will only apply if: (1) courts use a definition of 
merchantability that focuses only on the danger of obesity from 
fast foods; (2) plaintiffs are able to show present research 
showing that fast food is addictive;172 and (3) the courtís 
interpretation of merchantability is broader than the sellerís 
promise that the goods will function as expected by an ordinary 
consumer.173  Therefore, only an interpretation of warranty that 
ìmerely requires goods to fulfill the basic functional purpose for 
which such goods are usedî will prevent liability from 
following.174  In todayís present environment, in which regardless 
of all the hype about fitness and weight loss, the nation appears 
to be unwilling to effectively address the dangers of obesity,175 
and with no conclusive showing that fast food is addictive, it is 
highly unlikely that a suit based on an implied warranty of 
merchantability will be successful. 
4. Strict Liability: Strict Product Liability 
Under a strict product liability theory, the fast-food industry 
might be strictly liable for the harm caused by any defective 
product sold.  However, according to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, the plaintiffs would be successful only if the product was in 
a ìdefective condition unreasonably dangerous.î176  As noted in 
Pelman, comment i to section 402A of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts clearly addresses and negates the argument that the 
danger from over-consumption of high fat food was so 
unreasonably dangerous that fast food was defective.177  The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts defines food defects in terms of a 
 
contributes to the smokerís ultimate injury, in Grinnellís case, lung cancer.î). 
 172 In an article discussing the implied warranty of merchantability, one author 
suggests that if fast food is shown to be addictive and if the public perception of the 
addictive nature of fast food changes, it will enable plaintiffs to ìanalogize their U.C.C. 
section 2-314 claims to those of plaintiffs injured by cigarettes.î  Crawford, supra note 27, 
at 1220.  Evidence of fast foodís addictive qualities is not far-fetched.  First, fast food is 
generally high-fat and served in larger portions.  Researchers have also identified 
hormonal changes that ìremove some element of free willî and have shown similarities 
between drug addiction and sugar addiction.  Diane Martindale, Burgers on the Brain, 
NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 27-29.  ìHowever, the idea that food is addictive is far 
from mainstream.î  Id. at 29.  See also Jiali Wang et. al., Overfeeding Rapidly Induces 
Leptin and Insulin Resistance, 50 DIABETES 2786 (2001); Carlo Colantuoni et. al., 
Evidence that Intermittent, Excessive Sugar Intake Causes Endogenous Opioid 
Dependence, 10 OBESITY RESEARCH 478 (2002), http://www.obesityresearch.org/cgi/
content/abstract/10/6/478. 
 173 See Crawford, supra note 27 at 1223-24. 
 174 Id. at 1224. 
 175 This is my own opinion based on evidence that obesity and its effects are growing 
rather than retreating. 
 176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 402A (1965) (emphasis added). 
 177 Id. ß 402A cmt. i. 
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consumer expectation test.178  Under this test, manufacturers 
would not be liable for causing obesity if consumers were aware 
of fast foodís dangerous qualities.  In simple terms, consumers 
know that if they eat too much high fat food they get fat.  
Therefore, under these definitions of defectiveness, no liability 
would likely follow. 
On the other hand, courts could use a risk-utility test for 
defectiveness.  Under that test, ìcourts attempt to balance the 
risks of the product as designed against the costs of making the 
product safer.î179  The problem with this test is that food is 
essential for life, and the risk comes largely from over-
consumption.  Therefore, any attempt to make food safer is 
counter-productive if the food continues to be over-consumed.  
The only way to skirt this argument is to claim that ìa product is 
simply so dangerous that it should not have been made available 
at all.î180  This difficulty was highlighted in Pelman when 
plaintiffs were unable to meet the burden of proving that fast 
food is ìso extraordinarily unhealthy that they are outside the 
reasonable contemplation of the consuming public or that the 
products are so extraordinarily unhealthy as to be dangerous in 
their intended use.î181  Obviously, this is a heavy burden to 
prove, and, therefore, the risk-benefit test becomes mostly a 
policy choice on whether dangerous products should be sold at 
all. 
5. Strict Liability: Product Liability, Duty to warn 
Under strict product liability in tort, the plaintiff may also 
argue that the fast-food industry has a duty to warn of the 
unhealthy attributes of their products.  But as  noted in Pelman, 
the duty to warn depends on a variety of factors such as: the 
feasibility and difficulty of issuing a warning, the obviousness of 
a risk, the knowledge of the users, and proximate cause.182  
Again, although a warning may be both feasible and easy to 
issue, the risk from eating fast foods is obvious and in the 
common knowledge of most consumers relieving the producer of 
the duty to warn.  On the other hand, a plaintiff may complain 
that portions are super-sized at fast-food restaurants, thus the 
danger of over-consumption is concealed.  The difficulty with this 
argument is that portion size is also obvious and within the 
common knowledge of the consumer.  Consumers are usually 
 
 178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 7 (1997). 
 179 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 357, at 985. 
 180 Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994). 
 181 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 182 Id. at 540. 
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provided with a range of sizes, and they will make the choice to 
continue eating or not.183  For these reasons it seems unlikely 
that allegations based in a strict liability duty to warn will be 
successful. 
6. Negligence 
Finally, plaintiffs may argue that the fast-food industry is 
negligent.  Negligence is ìunreasonable conduct, as measured 
against the conduct of a reasonable prudent manufacturer in the 
same or similar circumstances.î184  Modern courts hold food 
manufacturers to a duty of reasonable care for manufacturing 
and design defects.185  However, in the obesity context, plaintiffs 
may find it difficult to identify the duty manufacturers have to 
consumers to make healthier products.  In cases involving gun 
manufacturers, courts used a multiple-factor balancing test to 
determine whether the defendant owed a duty to consumers 
injured by their products.186  These factors were enumerated in 
Rowland v. Christian and are: the foreseeability of the plaintiffsí 
harm, the certainty of the plaintiffsí injury, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendantís actions and the plaintiffsí 
injury, the culpability of the defendantís conduct, the desirability 
of preventing future harm, and the burdens and benefits of 
imposing such a duty.187  It is interesting to note that the Pelman 
decision held that no duty existed without resorting to these 
factors because it determined that over-consumption was out of 
the control of the manufacturer.188  However, an analysis of the 
factors is instructive. 
For example, the foreseeability of harm to an individual 
plaintiff is attenuated.  All people eat, but not all become fat.  
Only a certain proportion of the population is susceptible to 
obesity.189  The closeness of the connection between fast-food 
restaurants and obesity for a majority of its customers is limited 
by the frequency of their visits to fast-food restaurants.  Also, 
 
 183 Some research has shown that non-obese children will stop their total percentage 
of calorie input at lower levels than obese children when provided with larger portion 
sizes.  Obese people continue to eat.  This research suggests that the size of the portions 
does not cause obesity; what the obese children lack is control.  Pediatric Obesity; Fast 
Food is Lure to Overweight Children, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS, Nov. 8, 2003, at 30. 
 184 Owen, supra note 41, at 861. 
 185 Id. at 889. 
 186 Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-defective Products: An 
Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 952-54 
(2002). 
 187 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
 188 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 189 James O. Hill, An Overview of the Etiology of Obesity, in EATING DISORDERS AND 
OBESITY, A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 460, 463 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Kelley D. 
Brownell eds., 2002). 
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unless fast-food restaurants deceive consumers, feeding hungry 
people is not a culpable act.  Furthermore, although there are 
certainly many desirable benefits to preventing unhealthy eating 
habits, placing the burden of improving the nationís eating habits 
on the fast-food industry by making them liable for obesity would 
not necessarily accomplish that aim.  Most likely, the fast-food 
industry would react by either providing warnings or by 
providing healthier alternatives.  In that case, the public would 
most likely just turn to the abundance of unhealthy alternatives 
in the grocery stores or disregard the warnings and continue 
their unhealthy diets.  Such a reaction is likely, however, when 
one observes that the addition of nutritional information on food 
products has hardly seemed to change peopleís eating habits.  
Thus, these factors do not clearly indicate that the burden in 
creating a duty and imposing liability on the fast-food industry 
would necessarily benefit society. 
Even if plaintiffs established a duty, to prove negligence the 
plaintiffs must also prove that the fast-food industry breached 
that duty and that that breach caused the plaintiffsí damages.190  
In Pelman, the court found that the plaintiffs could not establish 
a prima-facie case for causation.191  A further analysis of 
causation in the obesity context will be continued below.  
However, unless the plaintiffs can establish this causation, 
negligence will likely fail. 
B. Barriers to Fast-food Liability 
To find fast-food corporations liable for their contribution to 
the nationís obesity, plaintiffs must overcome three significant 
obstacles under any theory of product liability.  They must prove 
that: the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous as 
sold; the defendant had a duty to prevent the danger from the 
product even when the plaintiff was aware of its harmful 
properties; and the product caused them injury. 
To put it simply, eating high fat, carbohydrate rich fast foods 
can be extraordinarily unhealthy and dangerous.  Does that 
make this food defective?  The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
suggests that courts consider a ìharm-causing ingredient of the 
food product . . . a defect if a reasonable consumer would not 
expect the food product to contain that ingredient.î192  Under this 
standard, fast foods are not defective because the public 
generally expects them to be high fat and carbohydrate rich.  
 
 190 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 114, at 269. 
 191 See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text. 
 192 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 7 (1997). 
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This barrier, however, can be overcome if courts adopt a risk-
benefit test.  Fast foods generally fail this test because these 
foods have significant negative health effects and are of suspect 
nutritional value.  Unfortunately, the difficulty with the risk-
benefit test is in articulating a universal standard to measure the 
nutritional benefits of specific food products against their 
negative health effects.  Given the constantly changing 
information as to appropriate nutritional choices, it is doubtful 
that such a standard would be accepted by the public.193 
It is even more difficult to establish that the fast-food 
industry has a duty to its customers when there is an extensive 
legal history suggesting that plaintiffs are personally responsible 
for the harm caused by products they purchase with knowledge 
of their dangerous qualities.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability section, and 
an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have indicated that 
plaintiffs must take responsibility for their actions.  As noted in 
Pelman, the Restatement (Second) of Torts exempted the food 
industry from taking responsibility for over-consumption of 
food.194  The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
comment j also adopts the position of section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts on over-consumption.195  Finally, 
an overwhelming number of jurisdictions have held that there is 
no duty to warn consumers of obvious risks.196 
The most difficult barrier to ascribing liability to the fast-
food industry is causation.  Plainly, obesity is caused by many 
factors.  For example, one study identified the following short 
lists of factors that cause weight gain with aging: a decline in 
resting metabolic rate; a decline in physical activity; an increase 
in food intake; high fat diets; family, social, and cultural 
attitudes toward weight; and genetic factors.197  Furthermore, Dr. 
Brownell, Yale psychology professor and director of the Yale 
Center for Eating and Weight Disorders, also blamed the rise in 
obesity on a toxic environment for physical exercise.198  Any 
successful claim against the fast-food industry must provide a 
 
 193 See e.g. NESTLE, supra note 22, at 67-110. 
 194 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
 195 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 2 cmt. j (ìIn general, a 
product seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or instruct regarding risks and 
risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable 
product users.î). 
 196 When the Products Liability restatement was issued in 1997, an ìoverwhelming 
majority of jurisdictionsî supported the rule that there was no duty to warn of obvious 
and generally known dangers.  Id.  Annotations of the restatement do not reflect a 
significant shift from that position. 
 197 Grundy, supra note 155, at 566S-67S. 
 198 Brownell, supra note 17, at 436-37. 
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causation theory to overcome these other factors in order to show 
that the fast-food industry is the sole or primary cause of the 
plaintiffís obesity. 
As in the gun manufacturing context, courts would have to 
allow plaintiffs to use easier tests for causation to prove their 
case in order for cases against the fast-food industry to be 
successful.199  The usual test for causation is the ìbut forî or ìsine 
qua nonî test that requires plaintiffs prove that they would not 
be injured if the defendantís act had not occurred.200  In the 
obesity cases based on negligent marketing, the plaintiff would 
have to comply with this test by showing that the defendantís 
advertising induced their consumption and the consumption 
caused their obesity.201  In Pelman, this was an insurmountable 
barrier.202  In some states a solution to this obstacle may be the 
use of a ìsubstantial factorî test.203  This theory is used when two 
factors join and either could have independently caused an 
injury.204  Because the decision whether a cause is substantial is 
given to the jury, this theory could potentially allow plaintiffs to 
establish causation if the fast-food industry became unpopular.205  
However, the burden to prove that the fast-food industry caused 
obesity would be on the plaintiffs, and it still would not relieve 
the plaintiffs from detailing how the other factors interacted with 
the fast-food industry actions to cause obesity. 
Even if plaintiffs were able to establish that fast foods 
caused their obesity, they would have the additional problem of 
establishing which restaurants were specifically responsible.  
Again, in the case of gun manufacturing, some courts allowed 
plaintiffs to solve this problem by using enterprise or market 
share liability.206  In the fast foods context, the use of either of 
these theories will have important implications and specific 
difficulties in application. 
Enterprise liability imposes ìstrict liability [on] business 
enterprises for harms perceived to be recurrently associated with 
their operation.î207  This would allow plaintiffs to sue a trade 
association ìon the theory that promulgating standards, or some 
other action by the association, contributed to his injuries.î208  
 
 199 See Ausness, supra note 186, at 946. 
 200 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 168, at 409. 
 201 See Ausness, supra note 186, at 946-47. 
 202 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 
 203 Ausness, supra note 186, at 947. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See id. at 948. 
 206 Id. at 948-49. 
 207 Dobbs, supra note 38, at 908. 
 208 Ausness, supra note 186, at 948. 
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The rationale behind this theory is that the members of the 
industry ìcooperate[d], tacitly or expressly, in particular 
conduct . . . [and] are said to be acting in concert.  Each of those 
acting in concert is liable jointly and severally for all the 
intended or foreseeable resulting harm.î209  In the fast food 
context, this theory would be justified either if members of the 
industry had worked together, intentionally or unintentionally, 
to deceive consumers210 or if juries accepted the argument that 
the costs of obesity could be passed on by the industry through 
insurance and higher prices.211 
Market-share liability is a theory created to assign 
responsibility when there is delay in the onset of damages and 
when it is difficult to identify the original manufacturer of a 
product.  It ìenables plaintiffs to recover from each member of an 
entire industry based on its market share of the products sold.î212  
This theory reached notoriety in diethylstilbesterol ìDESî cases, 
in which the plaintiffs faced the insurmountable barrier of 
finding which manufacturer among 300 provided their parents a 
fungible drug that caused their birth defects.213  There are some 
parallels and differences between DES and fast-food liability.  
Like DES, food is a fungible product, but unlike DES, it is not 
difficult to establish where plaintiffs ate when there is a pattern 
of consumer choices.  In this respect, liability for the fast-food 
industry is more analogous to liability in gun manufacturing.  In 
Hamilton v. Beretta,214 a main case on gun manufacturer 
liability, the New York Court of Appeals decided that market 
share was inappropriate because it was possible to identify the 
manufacturer and because different guns had different levels of 
risk.215  Fast food plaintiffs may face the same obstacle because 
different foods have different inherent risks based on their 
preparation and because it is much easier to identify where the 
plaintiffs have eaten. 
An additional obstacle to the use of these causation theories 
may be other industries that contribute to obesity.  The decline in 
physical exercise due to an increase in the popularity of 
sedentary activities is a ìsubstantial factorî causing obesity that 
 
 209 Dobbs, supra note 38, at 936. 
 210 See Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(holding a whole industry liable because they jointly controlled the risk created by 
inadequate standards for dynamite caps). 
 211 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 353, at 975.  See also, Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of 
Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997). 
 212 Ausness, supra note 186, at 949. 
 213 Frank J. Giliberti, Emerging Trends for Products Liability: Market Share 
Liability, Its History and Future, 15 TOURO L. REV. 719, 723-25 (1999). 
 214 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001). 
 215 Id. at 1066-67; Ausness, supra note 186, at 949. 
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makes these theories less workable.  If, as Dr. Kelley Brownell 
notes, ì[t]he computer, television, and video games have made 
sedentary behavior very appealing and engaging, especially for 
children,î these industries should also be included in the formula 
that assigns responsibility for obesity.216  Ultimately, the share of 
responsibility becomes excessively large and unworkable. 
C. Surmounting Barriers to Fast-food Liability; Negligent 
Marketing and Advertising 
Some courts may not find these barriers to fast-food liability 
insurmountable.  They may apply the theories developed to hold 
gun manufacturers liable for how they marketed and promoted 
guns.  In that context, plaintiffs have alleged that the 
manufacturerís ìmarketing practices . . . affirmatively created a 
risk of harm to others.î217  In a series of cases, courts found that 
gun manufacturersí ìspecial ability to detect and to guard against 
the risks associated with [their] products gave rise to a 
ëprotective relationshipí with those who might be injured.î218  
This was especially true when there was a relationship ìbetween 
a defendant and a third party, such as a parent and child,î and 
when the ìdefendant affirmatively enhanced an inherent risk.î219  
Furthermore, the duty arose because the risk from the 
defendantís conduct was foreseeable and therefore, the 
defendantís conduct was ìmorally blameworthy.î220 
Fast-food liability fits neatly into this theory, generally 
called negligent marketing or advertising.  Under this theory, 
plaintiffs would claim that the risk of childhood obesity is 
affirmatively enhanced by the marketing and advertising 
campaigns of the fast-food industry.  Additionally, plaintiffs 
would claim that fast-food companies target children and induce 
them to eat dangerous foods.  This conduct is foreseeable and 
intentionally increases the risk children will become obese. 
However, cases espousing this theory have been overturned 
by higher courts in the past few years.221  This led one 
commentator to cast doubt as to the future viability of this 
theory.222  Nonetheless, the theory has recently risen from ashes 
 
 216 Brownell, supra note 17, at 437. 
 217 Ausness, supra note 186, at 952. 
 218 Id. at 925 (discussing the following case using this theory: Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 
62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1999) revíd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). 
 219 Ausness, supra note 186, at 925-26, 932. 
 220 Id. at 932-33. 
 221 See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001); Merrill v. 
Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). 
 222 Ausness, supra note 186, at 965.  ìHowever, two cases decided last year, Hamilton 
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in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In Ileto v. Glock, a Ninth 
Circuit panel based liability on a claim that a gun manufacturerís 
ìaffirmative actions in distributing their products [created] an 
illegal secondary market for guns that targets illegal 
purchasers.î223  The Ileto court did not characterize the issue as 
one of product liability.224  Instead, the court held that the 
defendantís possible negligence in allowing its products to 
produce a nuisance could survive the defendantís Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.  This case rests on an interpretation of California 
nuisance law that suggests that certain occupations can become a 
nuisance ìwhen . . . business is performed in a manner that 
unreasonably infringes on a public right.î225  This allows 
plaintiffs to avoid the difficult proof issues for defectiveness in 
product liability by focusing solely on the effect of negligent 
marketing on the ability of the product to create a nuisance.  
Under this reasoning in Ileto, fast-food liability becomes more 
viable. 
By approaching the issue from the angle of negligent 
marketing, the Ileto court was able to find a duty on the part of 
the defendants and breach of that duty.  The court found a duty 
because Glock purposefully targeted and oversupplied states 
with less restrictive gun laws, increasing the probability that 
their guns would fall into the hands of illegal purchasers.226  An 
analogy to the fast-food industryís excessive targeting of children 
may be just as persuasive.  It is just as foreseeable that, by 
targeting children, the fast-food industry has affirmatively 
increased the risk of obesity.  Furthermore, in Ileto, the court 
found a breach of duty because ì[t]he social value of 
manufacturing and distributing guns without taking basic steps 
to prevent these guns from reaching illegal purchasers and 
possessors cannot outweigh the public interest in keeping guns 
out of the hands of illegal purchasers and possessors who in turn 
use them in crimes.î227  It is but a short step to make the 
argument that the social value of selling high fat, carbohydrate 
rich foods without taking the basic steps to inform parents of the 
unhealthy characteristics of this food cannot outweigh the public 
interest from keeping dangerously unhealthy food from 
vulnerable children. 
Only time will tell if the Ileto decision will stand or if its 
 
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. and Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., cast serious doubt about the future of 
negligent marketing as a viable legal theory.î  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 223 349 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 224 Id. at 1201-02. 
 225 Id. at 1214. 
 226 Id. at 1204-05. 
 227 Id. at 1205. 
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reasoning will ever be extended to claims against the fast-food 
industry.  Ileto relies on a substantial factor test to prove 
causation, and its extension of nuisance beyond real property was 
controversial in California.228  As noted earlier, the substantial 
factor test raises its own difficulties in the fast food context.  
Furthermore, the Ileto dissent took issue with the majorityís 
characterizations that it was not a product liability action and 
that nuisance created by a product could be extended in 
California beyond real property.229  It is difficult to predict 
whether this extension of nuisance law will be beneficial to fast-
food litigation plaintiffs.230  In spite of these difficulties, it is 
possible that some courts may find the fast-food industry liable 
for causing obesity by using the reasoning of Ileto and other 
lawsuits against gun manufacturers.231 
V. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR OBESITY LIABILITY 
A. The Root of the Public Policy Debate 
The McDonaldís litigation was about choices made by 
plaintiffs in response to an environment in which they were 
encouraged to consume fast foods by major corporations.  The 
reason plaintiffs seek to find these corporations liable is 
obviousóthe fast-food industry has a powerful role in controlling 
what we eat.  According to the United States Department of 
Agriculture, in 2000 the nationís 844,000 food service eating 
establishments sold over $358 billion worth of meals and 
snacks.232  Fast-food sales accounted for $125 billion of these 
sales.233  Food service sales are projected to account for 49% of 
total food sales by the year 2010.234  The fast-food industry 
 
 228 Id. at 1206, 1213-14. 
 229 Id. at 1220, 1223-24 (Hall, J. dissenting).  ìBut to assert that this action is not 
about products borders on the absurd. . . . The nature of appelleesí conduct cannot be 
analyzed apart from the product they are selling.î  Id. at 1220. 
 230 Presently, there is a substantial split of authority nationally over whether a public 
nuisance theory should be allowed in the gun context.  See City of Gary ex rel. King v. 
Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 & n.8 (Ind. 2003) (citing recent decisions 
either dismissing or allowing public nuisance action to proceed against gun 
manufacturers).  Therefore, it is even more difficult to predict whether the courts would 
find such a theory persuasive for claims based on obesity. 
 231 City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E. 2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002) 
(holding gun manufacturer can be ìheld liable for creating [a] nuisance.î); White v. Smith 
& Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828-29 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (finding a duty of care for gun 
manufacturers to children and other unauthorized users of handguns as well as 
municipalities who suffer both physical and economic injury through unauthorized gun 
use). 
 232 Charlene Price, Food Service, in  ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEPíT AGRIC., THE 
U.S. FOOD MARKETING SYSTEM, 2002, at 34, http:\\www.ers.usda.gov. 
 233 Id. at 35. 
 234 Id. at 34. 
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heavily advertises to maintain its proportion of the food dollar.235  
For example, McDonaldís is the largest fast-food advertiser at 
$1.3 billion in 2002, ranking 15th among the top 100 national 
advertisers.236  Therefore, plaintiffs could have a significant 
impact on the nationís health if they are successful in changing 
the practices of these corporations. 
The power of the food industry to influence eating behaviors 
especially impacts childrenís health.  One recent report 
commissioned by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
summarized many of the current studies on the role of the media 
in influencing childhood obesity.  Based on these studies, it 
concluded that: 
[I]t appears likely that the main mechanism by which media 
use contributes to childhood obesity may well be through 
childrenís exposure to billions of dollars of food advertising and 
cross-promotional marketing year after year, starting at the 
very youngest ages, with childrenís favorite media characters 
often enlisted in the sales pitch.  Research indicates childrenís 
food choicesóand parentsí food purchasesóare significantly 
impacted by the advertising they see.  The number of ads 
children see on TV has doubled from 20,000 to 40,000 since the 
1970s, and the majority of ads targeted to kids are for candy, 
cereal, and fast food.237 
From this perspective, the importance of the public policy debate 
becomes clearer.  In our society, children are born into this 
obesity-conducive environment encouraged by these powerful 
corporations.  However, it does not necessarily follow that these 
corporations should be held liable for the resulting obesity and its 
effects.  Aside from the fact that eating is an individual act of free 
choice, Congressís attempt to create a federal exemption for fast-
food liability has both positive and negative consequences to the 
fast-food industry and to our ability to address the causes of 
obesity. 
B. The Rationale for an Exemption for Fast-food Liability 
Many commentators have criticized the American legal 
system for allowing plaintiffs to bring ìfrivolousî suits against 
the fast-food industry, arguing that consumers should be 
personally responsible for their actions.238  The Personal 
 
 235 Id. at 79 app. tbl. 30.  In 1999, restaurant advertising was 3.4 million. 
 236 R. Craig Endicott, 100 Leading National Advertisers, 74 ADVERTISING AGE, June 
23, 2003, at S-1. 
 237 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CHILDHOOD 
OBESITY 10 (2004), http://www.kff.org/entmedia/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PageID=32022. 
 238 See CTR. LEGAL POLICY MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT ON THE 
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Responsibility in Food Consumption Act would prevent plaintiffs 
from holding the fast-food industry liable for obesity.239  The 
National Restaurant Association has asked Congress to recognize 
that consumers should be personally responsible for their 
actions.240  This is the industryís strongest argument against 
these lawsuits.  One reporter summarized the argument as: 
ì[y]ouíre fat, your fault. . . . [P]eople can make their own choices 
about food and exercise.î241  Therefore, one of the negative 
consequences to fast-food liability, so the argument runs, is the 
policy implication of not holding people personally responsible for 
the harms caused by the exercise of their own free will. 
Another consequence of extending liability would be the 
damage to the public perception of the judicial system.  If 
plaintiffs were to be successful, undoubtedly there would be a 
strong public reaction to the outcome of the suit.242  It would be 
cited as another example of judicial activism that interferes with 
the proper role of the legislature.  It would be criticized as a 
blatant misuse of judicial resources.  Ultimately, it could lead to 
damaging public skepticism of the justice of our legal system. 
Of course, there are also economic consequences to imposing 
liability on the fast-food industry.  The restaurant industry could 
suffer from decreased sales from negative publicity, increased 
insurance costs arising from the exposure to liability and the 
burden of litigation expenses.243  And, the fast-food industry is 
 
LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003, at 18-19, at http:\\www.triallawyers.com 
 239 Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 240 ìNot only do the lawsuits we are discussing this morning fail to acknowledge the 
voluntary nature of the choices customers make, they also do not address the 
fundamental issue of personal responsibility.î  Personal Responsibility in Food 
Consumption Act: Hearing on H.R. 339 Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) [hereinafter Personal 
Responsibility Hearing] (statement of Christianne Ricchi, on behalf of the National 
Restaurant Association), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/87814.PDF. 
 241 Siobhan McDonough, Weighty Issues: Americansí Flab Spurs War Along Political 
Lines, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at A3. 
 242 According to a 2003 Gallup Poll: 
[N]early 9 in 10 Americans (89%) oppose holding the fast-food industry legally responsible 
for the diet-related health problems of people who eat that kind of food on a regular basis.  
Just 9% are in favor.  Those who describe themselves as overweight are no more likely 
than others to blame the fast-food industry for obesity-related health problems, or to favor 
lawsuits against the industry. 
Lydia Saad, Public Balks at Obesity Lawsuits, GALLUP POLL: TUESDAY BRIEFING, July 21, 
2003, at 109, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030721.asp. 
 243 INS. INFO. INST., OBESITY, LIABILITY & INSURANCE (arguing that the insurance 
industry should take the threat of liability seriously).  ìGiven the increasing cost and even 
scarcity of certain types of liability coverage, the recent obesity-related litigation against 
the fast-food industry is of special concern.î  Id. at 16.  Personal Responsibility Hearing, 
supra note 240, at 34-35 (arguing that liability for obesity could damage small businesses 
including her own).  See also Meg Green, Food Fright, BESTíS REV., Aug. 2003, at 24 
(discussing the repercussions for insurers caused by recent fast-food lawsuits). 
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certainly not the only one that could be held liable for obesity.  
The costs of future litigation and liability in industries across the 
board could potentially explode having a detrimental impact on 
the national economy.244  Although large corporations such as 
McDonaldís may have the resources to absorb these additional 
costs and the capacity to defend themselves, smaller companies 
would be less able to sustain these costs and more vulnerable to 
such lawsuits.245 
C. The Rationale Against an Exemption for Fast-food Liability 
Health commentators nationally and internationally have 
demonstrated that advertising by the food industry, and 
specifically the fast-food industry, has influenced the foods that 
children eat.246  By taking away the threat of liability for their 
actions, Congress would be implicitly supporting the actions of 
these corporations.  There should be a point where company 
action in search of sales and profitability at the expense of the 
public health becomes culpable.  This culpability will be forever 
evaded if liability against these companies is foreclosed. 
Congress should not interfere with the stateís prerogative in 
exploring this culpability.  The control of state courts is the 
province of the states, and federalism and comity suggest that 
states should be allowed to control their own product liability 
law.  Recent experience shows that some individual states are 
 
 244 The ice cream industry has also been notified it is a potential target!  Marguerite 
Higgins, Lawyers Scream About Ice Cream, WASH. TIMES, JULY 25, 2003, at A1.  One 
study identified the following industries that could be targeted: agriculture, food 
processors & manufacturers, beverage makers, food distributors, grocers, restaurants & 
franchises, advertising agencies, TV networks/magazines/newspapers, toy manufacturers, 
and sporting/entertainment organizers.  INS. INFO. INST., supra note 243, at 16.  There 
have been many articles and studies written as to the negative effect of litigation on the 
economy.  E.g. DAVID DIAL ET AL., TORT EXCESS: THE NECESSITY FOR REFORM FROM A 
POLICY, LEGAL AND RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 8 (2003) (discussing the economic 
impact of tort abuse on the states and national economies), available at 
http://server.iii.org/ yy_obj_data/binary/727182_1_0/tortreform.pdf. 
 245 See Personal Responsibility Hearing, supra note 240, at 34. 
 246 Shawna L. Mercer, et al., Possible Lessons from the Tobacco Experience for Obesity 
Control, AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1073S, 1075S (2003) 
Television appears to be directly and causally related to the prevalence of obesity among 
children . . . . Televised food advertisements have a major influence on the dietary intake 
of children. . . . [A] recent study found that food products account for more than 60% of the 
products advertised on Saturday morning television programs for children. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Andrew Oliver, Note, The Proposed European Union Ban 
on Television Advertising Targeting Children: Would it Violate European Human Rights 
Law?, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTíL & COMP. L. 501 (2000).  ìSwedish law bans all television 
advertising that specifically targets children under the age of twelve.  This prohibition . . . 
affects not only toy advertisements, but covers advertising for sweets and fast foods as 
well.î  Id. at 501.  Sweden attempted to extend this ban to all of Europe to protect 
children from the effects of such advertising.  Id. 
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moving toward restricting liability,247 and there is a real value in 
allowing the states to be a ìlaboratory of experimentationî248 to 
find the best solution to deal with the public policy issues 
presented by obesity.  In the same vein, respect for the appellate 
process suggests that there is no need for the federal government 
to step in.  The appellate process worked to overturn lawsuits 
brought against the gun industry,249 and therefore, it is probably 
even more likely that the appellate process would be quicker to 
overturn suits for obesity.  Without at least some evidence the 
states cannot handle the issues arising from obesity liability, 
Congress should allow the states to make their own individual 
decisions. 
By foreclosing liability, Congress would also prevent other 
important functions of product liability litigation.  Our product 
liability system ìbrings into public view decisions balancing the 
utility and the hazards of the products we use and depend on, 
[and] it allows the people to pass judgment on those decisions.î250  
It also influences the behavior of corporate executives who make 
decisions whether to market an unreasonably dangerous product 
or risk the discovery process and exposure to the media.251  
Congress would also take away the incentive product liability 
provides the fast-food industry to display warnings and 
nutritional information and promote healthier alternatives.252 
Of course, the food industry could take voluntary actions to 
curb its ìobesity-encouraging practicesî without an exemption 
 
 247 Louisiana has already passed legislation preventing liability for obesity and 
ì[n]ineteen other state legislaturesóArizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin ñ were 
consideraing similar bills as of March 1,î according to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.  CBSNEWS.com, House Passes ëCheeseburger Billí, at http://www.cbsnews
.com/stories/2004/03/10/health/printable605157.shtml (March 10, 2004).  See also, 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Excerpt from Issue Brief on Nutrition and 
Obesity, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/IBIntro.htm (Apr. 1, 2002) (detailing 
current state legislation dealing with obesity). 
 248 In the context of gun control, Justice Kennedy emphasized these values.  ìIn this 
circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may 
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where 
the best solution is far from clear.î  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 249 See e.g. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001); Merrill v. 
Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). 
 250 Bogus, supra note 31, at 219. 
 251 Id. 
 252 See Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-
Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms 
Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 51-52, 62, (discussing how the tort system has provided 
incentives for safety in the firearms and auto industries as a ì[c]omplement to [l]egislative 
and [a]dministrative [r]egulation.î). 
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from liability.253  However, if it did not change these practices 
and Congress prevented liability, the fast-food industry would no 
longer be exposed to both litigation and regulation.  The threat of 
litigation (and its subsequent effect on stock prices) is one of the 
most powerful tools available to change corporationsí behavior.254  
As noted by Professor Cass Sunstein, ìlawsuits are a form of 
regulation,î but they make up ìfor a shortfall of regulation by 
government agencies.î255  Without the threat of litigation, 
Congress will find itself facing the pressure for resolving these 
problems, and any shortfall in the regulation of these industries 
would likely be remedied by either federal legislation or 
regulation. 
Undoubtedly, the fast-food industryís exposure to product 
liability has costs,256 but at this time those costs are not 
significant as compared to potential costs of future regulation or 
legislation.  As addressed earlier, no present cause of action 
adequately supports liability, so an actual liability cost does not 
presently exist.257  But what of the argument that small 
restaurants will be forced out of business if liability is extended?  
Even if liability were imposed, it is unlikely that the costs 
shouldered by the small restaurants would be significant.  The 
small businesses will likely not be the first targets.  It is more 
likely that the $125 billion-strong fast-food industry, dominated 
by large corporations (who, as shown in Pelman, are well-able to 
defend themselves) would be the first target.  The cost equation 
must also be evaluated by taking into account the effect 
regulation may have on the corporate bottom-line.  Liability costs 
are felt after a corporation has committed misdeeds.  This allows 
the market to control costs by allowing the fast-food corporations 
to choose their level of self-regulation.258  If liability is foreclosed, 
the only governmental control of these corporationsí obesity-
promoting behavior will be through government regulation or 
taxation.  In the past few years, public health commentators 
have been calling for taxation of fast foods and for increased 
 
 253 Ben Kelley, Fair Warning for Fat Peddlers, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A27. 
 254 Samuel Loewenberg, Are Lawyers the New Regulators?, 2003 NATíL J. 2640, 2640-
41. 
 255 Id. at 2641 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 256 Bogus, supra note 31, at 218. 
 257 Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 339 (Feb. 10, 2004) at 
ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/50xx/doc5037/hr339.pdf. 
 258 Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products 
Liability, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 82 (1995) (arguing that the ìproducts liability system 
compensates for the shortcomings of administrative regulationî and ì[i]t stimulates self-
regulation, giving manufacturers a strong incentive to learn as much as possible about 
potential hazards and reduce risk.î).  See Lytton, supra note 252, at 52 (concluding that 
the ìthreat of tort liability provides incentives for the [gun manufacturing] industry to 
police itselfî). 
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regulation.259  The Food and Drug Administration has responded 
and recently unveiled its strategy to reduce obesity by strongly 
encouraging restaurants to begin including nutrient information 
in menus.260  Such encouragement could turn into regulation or 
taxation without the external controls of restaurant behavior 
from product liability.  In order to avoid potentially crippling 
federal regulations, the fast-food restaurants themselves should 
welcome the opportunity to state their case in the courts. 
Finally, in the aggregate, the costs do not outweigh the 
benefits provided by our product liability system as demonstrated 
by fast-food corporationsí response to threatened litigation.  The 
relatively few unsuccessful cases and their media exposure have 
brought beneficial changes to the way the fast-food industry does 
business.  The fast-food companies have responded to the 
incentives to self-regulate and have reduced their exposure to 
litigation.  The fast-food companies are now competing to show 
they can provide healthier alternatives and nutritional advice.261  
The success of companies demonstrating a commitment to 
supplying healthier alternatives and providing nutritional advice 
has spurred these changes across the industry.262  Even 
McDonaldís is changing its behavior and benefiting from that 
change.  In October 2003, McDonaldís named a director of 
worldwide nutrition and then in January 2004, launched an 
initiative called ìReal Life Choicesî in New York to provide 
nutritional education programs.263  In April 2004, McDonaldís 
 
 259 KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 217-35 (2004) 
(arguing that a good approach toward eliminating obesity would be to ìsubsidize all fruits 
and vegetables with revenue generated by a tax on soft drinks, snack foods, and fast 
foodsî and by making obesity a ìpriority in the four main [federal] food programsî). 
 260 Press Release, United States Department of Health & Human Services, HHS 
Unveils FDA Strategy to Help Reduce Obesity (March 12, 2004).  ìEncouraging the 
restaurant industry to launch a national, voluntary effort to include nutritional 
information for consumers at the point of sale.î  Id. 
 261 Elizabeth Lee, Fast Food Goes on a Diet, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 19, 2003, at A1. 
Consider whatís happened in just the past week.  McDonaldís announced it was teaming 
up with Bob Greene to promote a Go Active meal for adults, with a salad, a pedometer to 
count steps and a bottle of water . . . Wendyís revamped the nutrition section of its Web 
site to provide more information on meal choices, including recommendations for people 
who are dieting . . . Burger King unveiled its grilled sandwiches with 5 grams of fat, and a 
light combo meal made up of one of those sandwiches, bottle water and a salad. 
Id.  Nancy Dillon, McDís Goes Healthy in NY: But Nutritionists Query Programís Real 
Impact, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 2003, available at, 2003 WL 65395464 (describing how 
McDonaldís, Blimpie, and Burger King provide new products or nutritional advice on how 
to lower calories while eating at their restaurants). 
 262 Lee, supra note 261.  Fast-food companies are changing their behavior because of 
the ìsuccess of chains that have heavily promoted healthier choices, such as Subway and 
Wendyís.î  Id. 
 263 Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Corporation Announces Worldwide 
Nutrition Director (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://164.109.33.187/content/corp/news/
corppr/cpr10082003.html; Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Real Life Choices 
Teaches Consumers How to Eat the McDonaldís Food They Love and Stay on Track with 
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came out with a national campaign to provide ìAdult Happy 
Mealsî with salads, pedometers, and health advice for its 
customers.264  Perhaps the most striking change, however, is 
McDonaldís recent decision to stop ìsuper-sizingî its meals.265  
This change appears to be in direct response to potential liability 
problems and shows the potential deterrent effect of the threat of 
litigation.266  Furthermore, McDonaldís new menus, offering 
salad as a healthier alternative, has driven the company to even 
higher profits.267 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As product liability law presently stands, the fast-food 
industry will most likely not be held liable for influencing the 
publicís eating behavior.  The existing theories of product liability 
do not appear to support such an action.  Pelman demonstrates 
the difficulty courts have in assigning responsibility to the fast-
food industry when plaintiffs have made choices with obvious 
risks.  Pelman also presents the difficulty plaintiffs will have in 
establishing that fast food is a defective product, in creating a 
duty toward the plaintiff, and in finding that fast food caused 
their injuries.  In the near future, these obstacles may be 
insurmountable. 
Yet one is left with the unsettling feeling that obesity is not 
strictly a personal choice.  It is undisputed that the food industry 
markets to children to influence both their behavior and, through 
them, their parentsí behavior.  Children are incapable of making 
these choices, and it is questionable that parents should shoulder 
all the blame for these actions when there are such powerful 
forces working against them.  Whether the fast-food industry has 
 
Their Diets (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http://164.109.33.187/usa/news/current/conpr_
01062004.html. 
 264 Dave Carpenter, McDonaldís Rolls Out Adult Happy Meals, ORANGE COUNTY 
REG., Apr. 16, 2004, at B1. 
 265 Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Media Response to Core Menu and 
Super Sizing (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://164.109.33.187/usa/news/current/conpr_
030120040.html. 
 266 Albeit McDonaldís has implied it is only a business decision based entirely on 
sales!  Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Sales Momentum Continues; Reports 
Record February Sales, Up 23% (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.mcdonalds.com/
corp/news/fnpr/fpr_03052004.RowPar.0001.ContentPar.0001.ColumnPar.0006.File.tmp/M
CD%20Sales%20Update%20February%202004.pdf. 
 267 See McDonaldís Healthier Menu Brings Back Profits, DAILY EXPRESS, Oct. 24, 
2003 (describing the effect McDonaldís healthier menus have had on profits in the United 
States), available at 2003 WL 65920716.  See Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., 
McDonaldís Sales Momentum Continues; Reports Record February Sales, Up 23% (Mar. 
5, 2004) (indicating that one of the drivers of its tenth consecutive month of improved 
sales was enhanced menu variety), available at http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/news/
fnpr/fpr_03052004.RowPar.0001.ContentPar.0001.ColumnPar.0006.File.tmp/MCD%20Sal
es%20Update%20February%202004.pdf. 
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created a public nuisance by promoting unhealthy products and 
whether courts should ever interfere in this area of personal 
choice are difficult questions.  Ultimately, these issues are not 
completely answered by existing theories.  Thus, it is wise to 
allow the federal government, state legislatures and state courts 
to grapple with these issues without a foreclosure of product 
liability for obesity.  History has shown that the laws of product 
liability have adapted to hold manufacturers responsible for 
culpable conduct.  Fast-food litigation should stand or fall 
depending on whether the public finds the industryís conduct 
culpable through both the litigation and the regulation process.  
The current pervasive presence of obesity in the United States 
suggests that this problem will not be reduced nor eliminated 
soon without continued attention to these issues. 
 
